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Abstract
The Ekert quantum key distribution protocol [1] uses pairs of en-
tangled qubits and performs checks based on a Bell inequality to detect
eavesdropping. The N-DEB protocol [2] uses instead pairs of entan-
gled qudits to achieve better noise resistance than the Ekert protocol.
It performs checks based on a Bell inequality for qudits found in [3]
and which we will refer to as the CGLMP-d. In this paper, we present
the generalization of our protocol h3DEB [4] for qudits. This proto-
col also uses pairs of entangled qudits, but achieves even better noise
resistance than N-DEB and is showed to be secure against the same
family of cloning attacks than N-DEB. This gain of performance is
obtained by using another inequality called here hCHSH-d, which was
discovered in [5]. For each party, the hCHSH-d inequality involves 2d
observables. We explain how the parties can measure these observables
and thus are able to check the violation of hCHSH-d. In the presence
of noise, this violation allows the parties to ensure the secrecy of the
key because it guarantees the absence of a local Trojan horse attack.
The advantage of our proposed scheme is that it results in an increased
resistance to noise while remaining secure against individual attacks.
1
1 Introduction
The Ekert91 protocol [1] exploits pairs of entangled states to exchange keys,
and uses Bell inequalities to detect eavesdropping. Some of the measurement
results obtained by the two parties Alice and Bob are perfectly correlated,
providing key bits. Other measurement results must exhibit quantum be-
haviour if there is no alteration of the quantum channel, and this permits
to detect eavesdropping by testing a Bell inequality violation.
The amount of quantum violation is an important characteristic in key
distribution protocols because a larger violation is one of the factors that
lead to a better noise resistance [6]. Some progress has been made to increase
this amount of violation with the use of parties with higher dimension [7]
or specific entangled states. One can also consider choosing different Bell
inequalities to detect eavesdropping.
In their article introducing the N-DEB protocol [2], Durt, Kaszlikowski,
Chen and Kwek use d-dimensional quantum systems (qudits), and the CGLMP-
d inequality to obtain better noise resistance than for the Ekert’91 protocol.
Our work makes one step further by using a recent discovered Bell inequal-
ity (here called hCHSH-d), which belongs to the family of homogeneous Bell
inequalities introduced in [5]. The amount of violation which can be achieved
with entangled states is even better than for the CGLMP-d. Consequently,
the protocol we derive is more tolerant to noise than N-DEB.
Devices called multiport beam splitters [8] (or ditters), are mentioned in [2]
as one way to handle measurements of qudits. Ditters are analyzed in [9]
and experimentally tested for d = 3, 4 in [10]. Our new protocol hdDEB
described in this article is analysed in view of the use of ditters to imple-
ment measurements. A crucial point here will be that some products of
observables, each implemented by a ditter coupled with a measurement in
the computational basis, can also be implemented by another single ditter.
This is needed for our protocol as the inequality hCHSH-d involves such
products.
The paper is organized as follows. It begins with some reminders and pre-
cisions about measurements with ditters in Section 2, where we also consider
the use of ditters for implementing the product of observables. Then Sec-
tion 3 recalls the N-DEB protocol. After that, Section 4 introduces the Bell
inequality hCHSH-d we use and defines our new protocol hdDEB. In Sec-
tion 5, we study the security of our protocol against individual attacks and
we show that our protocol hdDEB reaches a compromise between resistance
to noise and security. Finally, the paper concludes about the advantage of
hdDEB providing better resistance to noise.
2
2 Prerequisites
In what follows, all the sums will be taken modulo d. Our protocol use qudits
and observables with d outcomes which we label for readability 1, ω, ..., ωd−1
where ω is the dth root of unity ω = e
2ipi
d . The observables used by the two
parties Alice and Bob will be denoted respectively by Ai and Bj for some
indexes i and j. We will also use the correlation functions introduced in [10] :
E(AiBj) =
∑
a,b=1,ω,...,ωd−1
P (Ai = a,Bj = b) ab.
2.1 Measurements with ditters
A ditter is parameterized by a d-uplet (ϕ0, ϕ1, ..., ϕd−1) of phase shifts. For
readability we put θj = exp(iϕj) (for j = 0, 1, ..., d−1) and Θ = (θ0, ..., θd−1).
The ditter performs over a qudit the following unitary transformation :
UΘ := HDΘ =
1√
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ωklθl |k〉 〈l|
where the matricesH andDΘ areH = (ω
kl)0≤k,l≤d−1 andDΘ = diag(θ0, ..., θd−1).
After the transformation performed by the ditter, a measurement in the
computational basis is made using d detectors. This measurement is repre-
sented by the observable
Z =
d−1∑
k=0
ωk |k〉 〈k| .
As we assumed the d possible outcomes to be labeled by complex roots of
unity, we use unitary observables. Thus, the measurement obtained by the
combination of the ditter and the detectors corresponds to the following
observable
ZΘ := DΘ∗H
†ZHDΘ =
d−1∑
k=0
θkθ
∗
k+1 |k + 1〉 〈k| (1)
which gives us, in the particular case where θj = θ
j:
ZΘ = θ
d−1 |0〉 〈d− 1|+
d−2∑
k=0
θ∗ |k + 1〉 〈k| . (2)
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2.2 Products of incompatible observables
Suppose that we have two measurement devices (each one represented by a
ditter and a measurement in the computational basis), which implement the
observables ZΘ and ZΛ described by Equation (1), with Θ = (θ0, θ1, ..., θd−1)
and Λ = (λ0, λ1, ..., λd−1). Then we need to implement the product observ-
able ZiΘZ
j
Λ for i = 1, ..., d − 2 and j = d− i− 1.
Proposition 1. Let define the d-uplet of phase shifts Γ = (γ0, γ1, ..., γd−1).
For any i = 1, ..., d − 2 and j = d− i− 1, the observable ZiΘZjΛ verifies :
ZiΘZ
j
Λ = Z
†
Γ =
d−1∑
k=0
γk+1γ
∗
k |k〉 〈k + 1|
with
∀k = 0, ..., d − 1 γk = θkθk+1...θk−i−1λk−iλk−i+1...λk.
Proof. From Equation (1), we write :
ZiΘZ
j
Λ = (
d−1∑
k=0
θkθ
∗
k+i |k + i〉 〈k|)× (
d−1∑
l=0
λlλ
∗
l+j |l + j〉 〈l|)
=
d−1∑
l=0
θl+jθ
∗
l+i+jλlλ
∗
l+j |l + i+ j〉 〈l|
=
d−1∑
k=0
θk−iθ∗kλk+1λ
∗
k−i |k〉 〈k + 1| .
The generalized Pauli matrix Z in dimension d verifies Zd = Id. The
matrix Z being unitary, it also verifies Id = ZZ
†, which gives Zd−1 = Z†.
For any observable ZΩ we have Z
d−1
Ω = D
∗
ΩH
†Z†HDΩ = Z
†
Ω. In order to
rewrite a product observable as a new ditter measurement of the form Z†Γ =∑d−1
k=0 γk+1γ
∗
k |k〉 〈k + 1|, we need γk+1γ∗k = θk−iθ∗kλk+1λ∗k−i. One of the
possible solutions is :
∀k = 0, ..., d − 1 γk = θkθk+1...θk−i−1λk−iλk−i+1...λk.
From Proposition 1, we conclude that any product observable ZiΘZ
j
Λ is
implementable by a ditter and a detector, with the detector performing a
measurement corresponding to the observable Z† instead of Z.
3 The N-DEB protocol
We will recall the N-DEB protocol introduced in [2].
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3.1 The d-dimensional inequality used in N-DEB
For a given value of d, the N-DEB protocol uses the d-dimensional inequality
introduced in [3] which is referred in N-DEB as the generalized CHSH and
which we will call in our paper the CGLMP-d inequality. The maximally
entangled state
|ψ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|jj〉 (3)
is known to violate this inequality with the four bases used in N-DEB. For
these bases, we will use the same denomination ”optimal bases” as in [2].
The violation values for d = 3, 4, 5 are summarized in the following table :
d vd Nd
3 1.436 0.304
4 1.448 0.309
5 1.455 0.313
Table 1: Violation value of the
CGLMP-d inequality with the maxi-
mally entangled state for d = 3, 4, 5
.
3.2 The N-DEB procedure
Alice uses four observables Aa with a = 0 to 3, corresponding to ditter mea-
surements with phase shift (1, θa, θ2a, ..., θ(d−1)a). Bob use four observables
Bb with b = 0 to 3, corresponding to ditter measurements with phase shift
(1, θ−b, θ−2b, ..., θ−(d−1)b). The following steps are repeated until Alice and
Bob obtained a shared key of desired length.
1. Alice and Bob obtain an entangled pair of states in the maximally
entangled state defined in (3).
2. Alice draws randomly a value for a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and makes the mea-
surement corresponding to the observable Aa whereas Bob draws ran-
domly a value for b ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and makes the measurement corre-
sponding to the observable Bb.
3. When a = b, the results obtained by Alice and Bob are perfectly cor-
related. Indeed, the two ditters used by Alice and Bob perform on the
shared maximally entangled state the transformation (H ⊗H)(DΘ ⊗DΘ∗)
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with Θ = (1, θa, θ2a, ..., θ(d−1)a). But it is easy to check that:
(H ⊗H)(DΘ ⊗DΘ∗)( 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|jj〉) = 1√
d
d−1∑
k,k′=0
k+k′≡0[d]
∣∣kk′
〉
. (4)
Consequently, in this case where a = b, Alice and Bob obtain a new
dit for the shared key.
4. When a 6= b, Alice and Bob can use a fraction of their joint measure-
ments to detect eavesdropping by checking a configuration of maximal
violation of the CGLMP-d.
4 The hdDEB protocol
We will now describe our protocol. It achieves better noise resistance because
it uses an homogeneous Bell inequality, which has a larger violation factor
than CGLMP-d.
4.1 Violation of the inequality hCHSH-d
Depending on the entangled state that we want to use in our protocol, we can
choose an inequality belonging to the set of homogeneous Bell inequalities
described in [5] and which will be called hCHSH-d. It has also been shown
in [5] that the homogeneous Bell inequalities are satisfied under the hypoth-
esis of local realism, and that they form a complete set. An homogeneous
Bell inequality for two parties can in general be written
Re(
ρ
d2cos(pi
d
)
E(T )) 6 1 (5)
where ρ = e
ipi
d and T is an homogeneous polynomial in some measurements
Alice and Bob can make. We call T a Bell operator.
A feature of the homogeneous Bell inequalities is that T involve some prod-
ucts of observables (for example A31A2, A
2
1A
2
2 and A1A
3
2 for Alice in the case
d = 5) which become incompatible when considered as quantum observables.
The outcomes of such a product of course cannot be meant to be the prod-
ucts of outcomes of incompatible observables. In Proposition 1, we show
that if we use the unitary observables ZΘ defined in (1) for the Ai previ-
ously described, the product is also a unitary observable which outcomes
can be obtained with a single measurement. We also conclude that we can
perform this product measurement in terms of a new ditter operation and
a final detection in the computational basis.
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The local realistic elements Ad−11 , A
i
1A
j
2 (for i = 1, ..., d−2 and j = d−i−1)
and Ad−12 for Alice have to be replaced by the observables
Z†ΘA , Z
†
ΓijA
, Z†ΛA
where the Z†ΓijA is a product observable as described in Proposition 1 and
ΘA, ΛA are the parameters corresponding to the optimal bases. Similarly,
the party Bob has to use the observables Z†ΘB , Z
†
ΓijB
, Z†ΛB .
After substituting these observables to the variables in a Bell operator T , a
quantum state |ψ〉 violates the homogeneous Bell inequality associated to T
with a violation factor v > 1 if it verifies (compare to (5)) :
1
d2cos(pi
d
)
Re(〈ψ| ρT |ψ〉) = v for ρ = e ipid . (6)
4.2 The hdDEB procedure
As for the NDEB protocol described in [2], we denote Aa = A
d−1−a
0 A
a
1 with
a = 0, 1, 2, .., d−1 the observable parameterized by phase shift (1, θa, .., θ(d−1)a),
and Bb = B
d−1−b
0 B
b
1 with b = 0, 1, 2, .., d − 1 the observable parameterized
by (1, θ−b, θ−(d−1)b). Each of these observables is expected to be imple-
mented with a single ditter from Proposition 1.
1. Alice and Bob obtain an entangled pair of states in the d-dimensional
entangled state |ψ〉 :=
d−1∑
j=0
δj |jj〉 with δj ∈ C for some j = 0, ..., d − 1.
2. Alice draws randomly a value of a and performs her measurement in
the basis associated to the observable Aa whereas Bob draws randomly
a value of Bb and performs his measurement in the basis associated
to Bb.
3. When a = b, the results obtained by Alice and Bob are perfectly corre-
lated and they obtain a new dit for the shared key. For completeness,
a proof of this statement is given in Appendix A.
4. For some choices of a and b Alice and Bob collect the issues of their
measurements in order to detect eavesdropping by checking a violation
of the homogeneous Bell inequality hCHSH-d considered.
4.3 Choice of the inequality and resistance to noise for d = 3, 4, 5
With the four ”optimal bases” described in [2], the maximally entangled
states don’t allow to reach the largest violations. We consider several non-
maximally entangled states which, when used with their corresponding ho-
mogeneous Bell inequalities, reach largest violations. A precise derivation
of the case d = 3 can be found in [4].
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We compare the violations for the following states |ψd〉 with d = 3, 4, 5 :
|ψ3〉 = 1√
3
(|00〉 + |11〉+ |22〉).
|ψ4〉 = 1
2
(|00〉 + |11〉+ |22〉 + |33〉).
|ψ5〉 = 1√
5
(|00〉 + |11〉 + |22〉+ |33〉 − i |44〉).
We use the homogeneous inequalities associated to each |ψd〉 :
1
d2cos(pi
d
)
Re(ρE(Td)) 6 1 (7)
with
T3 = −
[
(ω − 4)(A21B21) + (ω + 2)(A21B1B2) + (ω − 1)(A21B22)
+ (ω + 5)(A1A2B
2
1) + (ω + 2)(A1A2B1B2) + (ω + 1)(A1A2B
2
2)
+ (ω + 5)(A22B
2
1) + (ω + 2)(A
2
2B1B2) + (ω − 1)(A22B22)
]
.
T4 = −(3ω + 1)(A31B31)− (ω + 1)(A31B21B2)− 5(ω − 1)(A31B1B22)
− (3ω − 1)(A31B32) + (ω + 1)(A21A2B31)− (ω + 3)(A21A2B21B2)
− (ω + 1)(A21A2B1B22)− (3ω + 1)(A21A2B32) + (3ω + 1)(A1A22B31)
+ (5ω + 1)(A1A
2
2B
2
1B2)− (7ω + 1)(A1A22B1B22) + 3(ω + 1)(A1A22B32)
− 5(ω + 1)(A32B31) + (ω − 1)(A32B21B2) + (ω + 1)(A32B1B22)
− (ω − 1)(A32B32).
For conveniency, the Bell operator T5 is derived in Appendix B.
These states and the Bell operators corresponding to their inequalities were
chosen because they reach the best compromise between noise resistance and
security against individual attacks, as it will be explained in Section 5.
We summarize each choice of entangled state and Bell operator in the
following table :
|ψd〉 Td vd Nd
|ψ3〉 T3 1.505 0.336
|ψ4〉 T4 1.546 0.353
|ψ5〉 T5 1.574 0.365
Table 2: Violation value of the
hCHSH-d inequality depending on the
entangled state and its Bell operator
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5 An alternative version of hdDEB secure against
individual attacks
5.1 An optimal cloning-based attack for the N-DEB and hd-
DEB protocols
A cloning-based attack uses a cloning machine (also known as cloner) to copy
an input state. Because of the no-cloning theorem, the clonage is imperfect
and the adversary aims to design an optimal cloner which copies a specific
set of states as accurately as possible. Depending on the properties of the
input state or the family of the cloner, the state can be reproduced with a
certain amount of fidelity FA defined in [2] by
FA = 〈ψ| ρ |ψ〉 (8)
where ψ is the initial pure state, and ρ the density of the clone (not neces-
sarily pure).
In [2] is described a cloning-based attack which uses a phase-covariant qudit
cloning machine. This cloner acts with the same accuracy on each states of
the optimal bases used in the N-DEB protocol. All these states are copied
with the same fidelity FA depending on the value of d :
d 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ∞
FA 0.7753 0.7342 0.7080 0.6898 0.6762 0.6657 0.6573 0.5
Proposition 2. The 2d bases considered in our protocol are copied with
maximal fidelity when using the optimal phase-covariant cloner described
in [2].
Proof. Four of our bases are the same optimal bases than from [2]. The
2(d− 2) remaining bases have vectors of the form :
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
eiγj |j〉.
But the cloner described in [2] is optimal for all states of the form :
d−1∑
j=0
δj |jj〉 for all δj verifying |δj |2 = 1d .
Consequently, this cloner is also the optimal asymmetric qudit cloner when
considering our 2d bases.
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5.2 The violation of an homogeneous Bell inequality as a
sufficient condition for security
The violation factor is considered very important for the security of the
key distribution protocol. The presence of noise is usually modeled by the
replacement of the initial entangled state by a mixture
N
I
d
+ (1−N) |ψ〉 〈ψ| (9)
where N is the proportion of noise. The point is that the presence of noise
decreases the experienced violation to (1 − N)v and that the protocol is
considered useless when the initial state entanglement cannot be detected
anymore. With this criterion, it has been shown that a protocol is resistant
to the presence of noise up to a threshold :
N = 1− 1/v. (10)
When using a noisy channel described by (9), the fidelity (as defined in (8))
between the input state |ψ〉 and the output state is given by
FN = 〈ψ| ρ′ |ψ〉 = −d− 1
d
N + 1
where ρ′ = N I
d
+(1−N) |ψ〉 〈ψ|. The presence of noise N does not erase the
non-classicality of the correlations as long as it stays below the value given
by (10). Hence, it is possible to use a channel for secure key distribution if
its fidelity satisfies
FN >
d− 1
dv
+
1
d
. (11)
Suppose that an adversary Eve uses an optimal cloner which copy an input
state with fidelity FA and introduces a minimal amount of error 1 − FA
indistinguishable from an unbiased noise.
Eve’s attacks won’t be detected as long as FA > FN . Hence, the security
of the protocol against individual cloning attacks is guaranteed if we have
d−1
dv
+ 1
d
> FA. This is equivalent to v <
d−1
dFA−1 .
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By replacing FA for each d = 3, 4, 5, we obtain the conditions :
d Security criterion
3 v < 1.508
4 v < 1.549
5 v < 1.575
6 v < 1.593
7 v < 1.607
8 v < 1.618
9 v < 1.627
∞ v < 2
5.3 Comparison between N-DEB and hdDEB under the same
security criterion
By looking at Table 1 and Table 2, we notice that for each d = 3, 4, 5 the
violation values of CGLMP-d and hCHSH-d are below the security criterion,
which ensure the security of the N-DEB and hNDEB protocols against this
family of optimal cloning attacks. But it is also noticeable that, for each
d = 3, 4, 5, there is a wide gap between the violation values attainable by
CGLMP-d and the maximal value tolerated by the security threshold. This
gap can be closed by the use of our inequality CGLMP-d which reaches
largest violation values :
d vN-DEB vhdDEB Security criterion
3 1.436 1.505 v < 1.508
4 1.448 1.546 v < 1.549
5 1.455 1.574 v < 1.575
Moreover, this exploitable gap between vN-DEB and the security criterion
increases with the dimension d. From this we conclude not only that our
protocol tolerates a higher error rate in the channel than N-DEB while
remaining secure against the same family of attacks, but also that this ame-
lioration grows for a higher d.
6 Conclusion
Our goal was to generalize our protocol h3DEB [4] in any dimension d. By
using the homogeneous Bell inequality hCHSH-d which reaches a better vi-
olation factor than the CGLMP-d in dimension d = 3, 4, 5, our new protocol
hdDEB obtain a better threshold of noise resistance than N-DEB.
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As the inequality hCHSH-d involves products of observables which become
incompatible for quantum states, an important fact is the possibility to
implement with slightly modified ditters the single observable correspond-
ing to these products. We showed in 4.2 that all the observables needed
to compute the violation of an homogeneous Bell inequality, including these
products of observables, can be implemented by replacing the final measure-
ment with observable Z by a measurement with observable Z†. Physically,
this replacement corresponds just to a permutation of the detectors.
The gain in noise resistance of our protocol over N-DEB is due to the use
of the inequality hCHSH-d.This inequality detects violations of local realism
when some measurements are multiplicatively related. By using ditters mea-
surements which respect this multiplicative constraints, the parties running
the protocol are able to exploit its larger violation capabilities.
The use of 2d bases instead of four has the drawback of decreasing the
effective dit transfer rate (the probability to obtain a key dit decreases from
1
4 to
1
2d) and it makes our protocol more complex (2(d − 2) supplementary
devices), which can be a potential source of added noise. In the other hand,
our protocol tolerates a higher threshold of noise than the one in the N-DEB
protocol.
In the paper [2], the security of the protocol N-DEB against the optimal
individual attack was investigated and it was possible to conclude that a
violation of the CHSH-d inequality was a sufficient condition to guarantee
the security against individual attacks. We study here the security of our
protocol hdDEB against the same optimal individual attack and we conclude
that our protocol is also secure against this cloning attack.
For the same level of security against individual attacks, we consequently
obtain a better noise resistance than N-DEB and this amelioration is more
and more visible when d increases.
Acknowledgement. One of the author (Z.A.) was partially supported by
Thales Alenia Space during this work.
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Appendix A
We show that in the hdDEB procedure, when a = b, the results obtained by
Alice and Bob are perfectly correlated.
Let first define the d-dimensional entangled state |ψ〉 :=
d−1∑
j=0
δj |jj〉 with
δj ∈ C for some j = 0, ..., d − 1.
The two ditters used by Alice and Bob perform on the state |ψ〉 the trans-
formation (H ⊗H)(DΘ ⊗DΘ∗), with Θ = (1, θa, θ2a, ..., θ(d−1)a). We use
the notations :
HDΘ :=
1√
d
d−1∑
k,l=0
ωklθl |k〉 〈l|
where the matricesH andDΘ areH = (ω
kl)0≤k,l≤d−1 andDΘ = diag(θ0, θ1, ..., θd).
We write :
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(H ⊗H)(DΘ ⊗DΘ∗) = (HDΘ)⊗ (HDΘ∗)
=
1
d
(
d−1∑
k,l=0
ωklθl |k〉 〈l| ⊗
d−1∑
k′,l′=0
ωk
′l′θl′
∣∣k′
〉 〈
l′
∣∣)
=
1
d
(
d−1∑
k,l,k′,l′=0
ωkl+k
′l′θlθl′
∣∣kk′
〉 〈
ll′
∣∣)
By applying this transformation to the state |ψ〉, we obtain :
(HDΘ ⊗HDΘ∗)(
d−1∑
j=0
δj |jj〉) = 1
d
(
d−1∑
j=0
d−1∑
k,k′=0
δjω
j(k+k′)
∣∣kk′
〉
)
From 1 + ω + ω2 + ...+ ωd−1 = 0 we finally find :
(HDΘ ⊗HDΘ∗)(
d−1∑
j=0
δj |jj〉) = (
d−1∑
j=0
δj)(
d−1∑
k,k′=0
k+k′≡0[d]
∣∣kk′
〉
)
Appendix B
In order to obtain the violation v ≃ 1.574, we use the entangled state
|ψ5〉 = 1√
5
(|00〉 + |11〉 + |22〉+ |33〉 − i |44〉).
with the following Bell operator :
T5 = (2ω
3 − 3ω + 6)(A41B41)− (4ω2 + 6ω + 5)(A41B31B2)
+ (7ω3 − ω2 + 2ω − 3)(A41B21B22) + (ω3 + ω2 − 4ω − 3)(A41B1B32)
+ 2(ω3 + ω2 + 3ω)(A41B
4
2)− (ω3 + 4ω2 + 3ω + 2)(A31A2B41)
− (5ω3+3ω2+3ω+4)(A31A2B31B2)− (2ω3+3ω2+2ω−2)(A31A2B21B22)
+ (−2ω3 + ω2 + 1)(A31A2B1B32) + (4ω2 − 2ω + 3)(A31A2B42)
+ (−ω2 + 3ω + 3)(A21A22B41) + (2ω3 + 7ω2 + ω)(A21A22B31B2)
− (4ω3 + 6ω2 + 5ω + 5)(A21A22B21B22)− (3ω3 + 2)(A21A22B1B32)
+ (5ω3 + ω + 4)(A21A
2
2B
4
2) + (−2ω3 − 4ω2 + 1)(A1A32B41)
+ (ω3 + ω2 + ω + 2)(A1A
3
2B
3
1B2) + (ω
3 + 3ω + 1)(A1A
3
2B
2
1B
2
2)
− (7ω3 + 7ω2 + 4ω + 7)(A1A32B1B32)− (3ω3 + 2)(A1A32B42)
+ (−2ω3 + 2ω2 + 3ω + 2)(A42B41)− (3ω3 + 1ω2 + 3ω + 3)(A42B31B2)
− (2ω3 + 3ω + 5)(A42B21B22)− (4ω3 + 5ω2 + 2ω + 4)(A42B1B32)
− (4ω3 + 6ω2 + 5ω + 5)(A42B42).
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